The Battle for ‘s-Hertogenbosch from the German perspective

Documents for 27-10-44

German soldiers and a sturmgeschutz of Oberleutnant Kopke’s Panzer.jager.abteilung 559 during the German counterattack on Saturday, October 27 near the ‘s-Hertogenbosch trainstation. By means of the Bosveldweg the Germans head for the Stationsplein.

 

27-10-44   During the night the south-west part of ‘s-Hertogenbosch was subjected

to own harassing artillery fire, but this couldn’t prevent the opponent to strengthen

himself with tanks and infantry during the course of the night.

 

                  Parts of Artillery Group Kiewitt went in to position in the sector south of

Heusden during the night. With the commander of A.R.191, commander of

s.Pz.Jg.Abt.559 and commander of the 59.Inf.Div. the support is discussed for our

own counterattack, starting from the train station area into the south to regain the

MLR. The 59.Inf.Div. refused to give support from the south by means of infantry.

This would have, based on the fact of the attempt made by the executive officer of

F.E.B.347 to communicate, would not even been possible anymore, because by then

the left wing of the 59.Inf.Div. already had to have been in position more to the west.

 

                 The beginning of the attack was ordered for 08.10 hrs after the south-

west part of the city would have been subjected to destructive artillery fire from

08.00 hrs until 09.10 hrs by A.R.1712 (artillery group north of the Maas, Art Group

Vlijmen), from 4 Batteries of the 59.Inf.Div and III./A.R.139. This order could be

conveyed only by radio to Art.Rgt.1712 (Art. Group north of the Maas).

 

                 The enemy realized we were preparing an attack and had the area from

were we would deploy destroyed by a heavy concentrated artillery attack. Our own

Infantry suffered heavy bloody losses during this attack. Nevertheless, supported by

3 Sturmgeschutzen and 2 Jagdpanthers the Infantry attacked 2 streets into a

southern direction and was the MLR to be regained at any price. The attack however

was lingered by strong defensive fire, whereby in particular the numerous enemy

Pak (Anti Tank Guns) laying in ambush stopped our push. One Jagdpanther and two

Sturmgeschutze were put out of action.

 

                 To cover the failure of the Battle Commander, the Division ordered the

north-west adjacent Battle Group Schulze to immediately order a Company with a

battle strength of at least 50 to be commanded by the Battle Commander. The

Artillery kept the order to give harassing fire on to the south-west part of ‘s-Hertogen-

bosch. It became apparent on 28.10., that against all orders, the Battle Commander

already had given orders for a withdrawal in the morning as he himself reported

at 14:30 that he attached himself, after the battle for the last row of houses at the

canal, to the rest of Battle Group Schulze, consisting out of two officers and about

30 men who were still able to fight. He immediately received the order by the

Division Commander to fight his way back into the city with the in the meantime

provided company of Battle Group Schulze (battle strength 68 men), or else report

himself for court martial at the Division. It was promised that he would be provided

with a further company of stranglers that were in the meantime cared for by the

Divisions Staff, geared up by the Nat.Soz.Fuhr.Offz. (National Sozialistische

Führungs Offiziere: Officers who made propaganda for the National. Socialist.

Party.) and were provided with weapons and ammunition by Section. Ib. At this

stage there still had to be parts of F.E.B.347, Battalion Ewald and remnants of other

groups in ‘s-Hertogenbosch. Finally at 18.00 hrs the enemy broke trough with

Infantry until the army barracks west of the blown and for tanks not suitable railway

underpass at the south-west exit of the city and until the sports area at the train-

station. Because of combined artillery fire the enemy was hindered to get any further

and retreated.

 

                The Division ordered Battle Group Schultze to order the company of

stranglers, that was accompanied by a strong force of shock troops and were marching

onto Engelen, to be commanded by an energetic commander and to report to the Battle

Commander. In the evening it appeared that, as ordered by the Battle Commander,

also the commander of FEB 347 had pulled out around 16.30 hrs. An order messaged

by radio directed to the Commander of FEB 347 that told him to hold out at any cost

was only partly received. Some brave groups though continued to stay in the city.

 

                 It became apparent after 28.10. that the shock troops deployed at the

north-west exit of the city encountered heavy resistance in the factory area. Numerous

soldiers returned back to Battle Group Schultze separated during the night because

of enemy artillery attacks. There could be told nothing with certainty about the fate

of Battle Commander Riedel. There are reports that he became wounded in action.

The Division assessed that because of its position and the available battle numb troops

the retaking of ‘s-Hertogenbosch was impossible. It was important to prevent the

enemy to breakthrough to the west. There for the Division had deployed the former

troops of bridgehead Hedel, 2 Company’s of .Lw.Bodenpersonal (Lw, Luftwaffe,

Air Force- Bodenpersonal, ground personnel) precautionary to the area of Bokhoven to

occupy a defensive position at the road fork (1km east of Vlijmen) along the

causeway leading north-east to Engelen, while 1 Company of FEB 1712 occupied the,

already from of 25.10. at the east boundary of Vlijmen, frontal positions along both

sides of the main road.

 

                 The bridge 1,5 km to the east of Vlijmen was prepared for demolition and

was to be blown when enemy amour should be approaching, without keeping notice

with the, for insurance forwardly deployed troops at Groot-Deuteren.